Molfar finds military targets on social media: destroyed railway bridge in the village of Dronivka, Donetsk region

Dear friends, we'd like to remind you about the reverse geolocation search training materials:

Fact-checking of the attack on the training ground of Russian soldiers: reverse search for the coordinates;
Fact-checking of the attack on the Russian fascists base: geolocation by photo;
Fact-checking of the attack on the base of Russian soldiers in Crimea: drone or the newest Ukrainian missile?

After the release of Molfar's sincere interview for NV radio, we can admit that it was not a reverse geolocation search 😉 Next, we plan to make a series of successful cases when we found something and then something with high accuracy arrived there with loud sound.

Molfar in social networks 👉 Molfar Global

What can be found in enemy social networks?

These can include location of ammunition depots, weapons depots, temporary barracks/residential areas of Russian military, enemy equipment locations, enemy headquarters and command posts, fuel and lubrication points, important logistics hubs (railroad tracks, intercity routes, active bridges, etc.), enemy electronic warfare sites, air defense systems (launchers) locations, fortified defense areas, and much more.

If the object is important, you need to establish its exact location.

Where to look for targets? An example of a successful practice.

It is necessary to monitor enemy news resources, propaganda media, and especially the broadcast channels of war correspondents. The constant need to conduct propaganda leads to the enemy publishing numerous photos and videos that can be used to identify the exact location of personnel, the location of combat units, armored vehicles, etc.

And, of course, you need to research the social networks of Russian military personnel. There is always something interesting there. Before you can identify a more or less significant military target, you will have to look through hundreds of photos and dozens of videos. So take care of your mental hygiene from the influence of enemy propaganda!

An example of a publication worthy of an investigator's attention ⤵️

Let's analyze the video.

Is this an important target to hit?
Can we exactly identify the target's coordinates?
What happens if the target is hit/ignored?

In a particular case, the answer to the first two questions is "Yes". The answer to the third question is: if the target is hit, the logistics supply chain of the invading army will be interrupted; if the target is ignored, the enemy will be able to quickly accumulate weapon, armored vehicles, and personnel to replenish supplies and form new strike groups in the Donetsk and Luhansk directions.

We decided that this was an important target, worthy of the investigator's attention. We are moving on to the next stage.

Comprehensive target analysis, target localization

On 05.07.2022, a video report (1) was posted on the tvzezda.ru website. The Russian military has built a pontoon railroad bridge across the Siverskyi Donets River, which is used to transport military personnel and military equipment. The new bridge is located near the old bridge, which was destroyed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is also noted that the largest amount of effort was spent not on the construction of the bridge, but on the repair of the 700-meter-long railroad track.

Date of video publication: July 5.
Location: Dronivka village.
Existing object: Yes.
Evaluation of the object: Railroad pontoon bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River, 1 pc.
Risk of civilian casualties: low.
Object coordinates: 48.9236502,38.036339

*Identification of the approximate location of the pontoon bridge*

*Photo of an old metal bridge and a new pontoon bridge from a propaganda story*

Photo of the bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River (before its destruction). Nearby, the Russians built a new pontoon bridge. The iron structure, landscape, and pier (supporting construction) match the image above.

*Evidence of military use of the bridge #1*

*Evidence of military use of the bridge #2*

The railway trucks carry heavy weapons and Russian soldiers. The photo shows a Russian armored train Volga, which is designed to conduct engineering reconnaissance, demining and restoration of railroad tracks in the war zone. The train cars are protected by 10-20 mm steel armor and are lined with sandbags inside. The armored train is armed with large-caliber machine guns and an anti-aircraft gun.

*A photo of the Volga armored train from the report, the beginning of the pontoon crossing*

*Photo of the armored train "Volga" from the report, the end of the pontoon crossing*

Quotes from the report:

“It is planned that the rebuilt branch line will be used by the Ministry of Defense to deliver military and humanitarian supplies”.
“There should be no mistakes. Too valuable cargo on board”.

At this stage, we have an identified target. To summarize: assessing the importance of the object, establishing the exact geolocation and solid evidence – that's the whole task. A little care and time, and you will be lucky!

👀 Molfar collects intelligence on the location of enemy personnel and the movement of enemy equipment across the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine. If you have any information, please send it to our Telegram bot. Anonymity is guaranteed! Do this only if you are 100% sure that the data transmission is safe for you and your close ones.

How to check the successful work of the Defense Forces?

The best thing is not to check. Just trust the Armed Forces of Ukraine and continue to do your job well. Also, we advise occasionally check the messages of the military command's spokespersons. In the case of the railroad bridge in the village of Dronivka, the Molfar OSINT community ordered a paid satellite image of the location mentioned in the report to demonstrate the strength of Ukrainian resistance.

*According to satellite image, there is no pontoon bridge and the old bridge is also destroyed. It is likely that the pontoon bridge and the bypass track were completely removed after the damage.*

❗️ The date of publication of the video is July 5. The date of target identification is July 6. The date of the photo above is August 7. As the saying goes: quickly built, quickly removed. There is not even a fragment of the pontoon bridge in the picture.